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The German philosopher Friedrich Hegel determined 
that a person's core substance does not derive from that 
person's deeds but from his or her projection in the cognition 
of the other, where "objective reality" is neutralized and the 
perceived reality of cognition rules. Carl von Clausewitz said 
that suppressing the enemy's combat spirit is no less 
effective than actually killing his soldiers. He stressed that it 
is necessary to complement kinetic combat with actions that 
affect the enemy's cognition. 
 
Ever since the early 2000s, especially in this era of 
global terror, we have repeatedly realized that the battlefield 
is not where the outcomes of a military confrontation are 
determined. The results of an operation or war are no longer 
determined by the number of casualties or targets hit but by 
the image imprinted in the public cognition in Israel and 
worldwide. More than many other countries, Israel is situated 
in a region pervaded by terrorist confrontations and has 
devised over the years methods to sway the cognition of 
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 Israeli society, terror organizations, and the international 
community. 
 
The type of confrontation that has largely replaced 
classical wars between sovereign states and regular armies 
has unique characteristics springing from the nature and 
conduct of terrorist organizations. In the sphere of cognition, 
terror organizations, ignoring any moral or legal rules, 
deliberately perpetrate various acts of violence to coerce 
governments into changing their policies. Two prominent 
terror organizations are at the focus of this threat to Israel: 
Hezbollah and Hamas.  
 
The struggle against terror organizations occurs on 
three fronts simultaneously: In the field, where security 
forces clash with terror organizations and individual 
perpetrators; on the political front, where both sides strive to 
secure the support of the international community and the 
Muslim world; and lastly, on the cognitive front, where both 
sides use a variety of methods and means to instill their 
stands and perceptions in relevant target audiences. The 
three fronts influence and complement each other. Each of 
their achievements or failures affects, sometimes crucially, 
the managing of the other fronts. The results of each 
confrontation between Israel and a terrorist adversary 
become engraved in the cogniton of the Israeli population 
and the populations of Gaza or Lebanon, but no less so in 
the global public opinion and among decision-makers 
worldwide. 
 
Military, public, and academic debates have been 
going on for years about the significance of the cognitive 
component in the operational success of military action. 
There was a need to implement creative thinking and 
diplomacy in the various public media to structure the 
required cognitive reality. People determine their views 

































on the social networks, internet sites, television, radio, and 
the printed press (by order of accessibility to the consumers). 
Israel and Hamas have both been investing creative thought 
and means to maintain their ability to influence. 
 
In the past, we used the term "information". 
Nowadays we speak about a cognitive campaign.  Academic 
writing about modern strategy frequently uses the term "new 
wars", describing the current battlefield as "a combat 
between people", in contrast to past combat means used in 
armored, aerial, and naval encounters. "New wars" is a 
recent term that has replaced the previous "limited 
confrontation" and "asymmetric war". Hezbollah and Hamas 
both operate amidst the civilian populations that surround 
them, using civilians as a human shield to hide seniors and 
conceal infrastructures and rocket launchers. They take 
advantage of the IDF's offensive response in that civilian 
environment to keep delegitimizing the IDF in the eyes of the 
world (a tank against a mosque, fire near a hospital – both 
hiding places for terrorist commanders, infrastructures and 
rockets). 
 
A cognitive campaign should be comprehensive, 
involve all the relevant state institutions and authorities, such 
as the military, security, legal, economic, and diplomatic 
bodies, and under close intelligence supervision. The media 
efforts made by the IDF, especially on the social networks 
the enemy is attentive to, are one example of an activity that 
has enormous operational potential for the State of Israel. 
This overt effort has a considerable potential to influence and 
turn around opinions, whether of decision-makers or the 
public at large. Acting on the overt media requires 
understanding and proficiency in the psychology of the 
masses and an ability to analyze and target specific 
audiences. 
 










































 • Three-stage action. Similar to other combat 
operations, an information operation also comprises a 
preparatory, simultaneous, and retroactive stage. This 
involves preparing diverse information materials during the 
planning stage, issuing ongoing reports while a military 
operation is underway, and summing up the data and 
lessons learned after reaching an arrangement for cessation 
of hostilities. 
• Cognitive-influencing actions require the 
participation of elements from the government, the military, 
local authorities, non-profit organizations, students, and 
Jewish and Israeli communities abroad. 
• Fake news: Develop an ability to refute fake 
news immediately as they appear but do not react to trivial 
details to avoid being perceived as lacking initiative and 
irresponsible. 
• Be prepared to "put out fires". Mishaps are 
likely to occur in almost every confrontation (such as fires, 
disaster). A skilled reaction team must be familiar with the 
facts and react before a mishap leads to confrontation. 
• Avoid superfluous details. Present the main 
data required to understand the results of an action in an 
appealing visual way. Creative graphic design is the best 
appetizer to taking in the information. 
• Employ an experienced professional staff. It is 
crucially important the people involved in information be 
highly experienced. 
• Restore the national information System. 
Israel's national information has been divided for years 
between different bodies and has suffered a lack of 
coordination and guidance. In 2007, after the Second 
Lebanon War, an attempt was made to improve the situation 
by setting up a National Information body within the Prime 
Minister's Office, which worked successfully for several 
years.  
• Direct Israeli information at the Arab world. In 

































initiated by the IDF Spokesman unit, the prime minister's 
office and the foreign ministry has grown noticeably. 
 
Two types of efforts associated with the culinary 
world stand out in the process of information dissemination 
during hostilities. One regards dissemination of preliminary 
information, much like “fast food” eaten on the spot but not 
necessarily satisfying. The other resembles a "gourmet 
meal" – thorough briefs and detailed written material, 
intended to reinforce the messages sent through various 
influence channels. 
 
In summary, the intelligence services play a highly 
significant role in the struggle for cognitive raising. In the 
past, intelligence work focused on obtaining enemy secrets, 
interpreting them, and distributing them to the decision 
makers.  Nowadays, it is not sufficient to know the enemy's 
secrets. Information and intelligence products must be put to 
use in the struggle for cognitive raising. Intelligence 
gathering is no longer just part of the secret war. It has 
become an integral factor in the effort to acquire materials 
from various sources to expose and refute enemy 
accusations and efforts to disseminate fake news. 
 
Information is crucial to national security, as the past 
decade's anti-terror operations have repeatedly proven. 
Information efforts must be a central part of the efforts the 
government makes in such events along with the military 
effort, the effort to protect the rear (the civil front) and the 
international political effort. The traditional Pavlovian 
reaction after every operation claims that "the information 
has failed". This claim is often unfounded. Israel no longer 
play the role of David in the historical battle of David and 
Goliath. We can no longer blame the problematic situation 
on lack of resources only. The cynical world wishes to see 
Israel weakened. We are better off strong and especially 
wise, rather than just right. 
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